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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In late January 1998, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr subpoenaed Marcia 
Lewis to reveal to a grand jury communications she had with her daughter, Monica 
Lewinsky, regarding Monica’s relations with President Bill Clinton.2  While most 
Americans were appalled by such behavior,3 these tactics are not new nor are they 
uncontroversial.  Academics and courts in the United States have been grappling 
with the issue of compelled parent or child testimony for more than twenty-five 
                                                                
1Associate, Holland & Knight LLP, Washington, DC Office.  J.D., 1999, Georgetown 
University Law Center; B.S., 1994, Webb Institute of Naval Architecture.  The author thanks 
her husband, Amish M. Shah, for all of his help and support, and dedicates this article in 
memory of her mother, Surekha S. Dharia, whose strength, kindness and love have guided her. 
2See Peter Baker, Lewinsky Met Privately with Clinton After Subpoena, WASH. POST, 
January 29, 1998, at A1.  President Clinton was alleged to have met privately with Monica 
Lewinsky urging her to lie under oath about their relationship during a deposition for Paula 
Jones’ case of sexual harassment against the President.  
3Letter from Alex Abrams, Lawyer, to Editor, N.Y. TIMES, March 30, 1998, at A16; David 
J. Wolfsohn & John S. Summers, Needed In Law and Society: Parent-Child Privilege, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, February 26, 1998, at A15; Robert Peterson & Gerald Uelmen, Commentary: 
Starr’s Legacy May Include a New Privilege; Law: Compelling Monica Lewinsky’s Mother to 
Testify Has Spawned Calls for Protecting Parent-Child Communications, L.A. TIMES, April 
23, 1998, at B9. 
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years.4  In March 1998, Congress introduced two bills concerning parent-child 
compelled testimony.5  The House of Representatives proposed substantive changes 
to the Federal Rules of Evidence to recognize a parent-child privilege in all cases.6  
The Senate proposed a study evaluating the necessity of a parent-child privilege, and, 
if found to be necessary, an evaluation of the type of privilege to institute.7  Under 
the Senate bill, a parent-child privilege would not extend to cases involving violence 
or drugs.8   
This article uses the recent bills in the House and Senate to analyze the parent-
child privilege debate.  First, this article will discuss the history of the parent-child 
privilege.  Next, the proposed bills will be evaluated to determine their effectiveness 
in achieving their goals and in resolving the debate.  This article will then discuss the 
effects that the passage or nonpassage of these bills (particularly the House bill) 
would have.  Finally, this article proposes a broad parent-child privilege. 
II.  BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE 
Although controversial, the idea of a parent-child privilege is not new.  In fact, 
the parent-child testimonial privilege has existed since ancient times.9  Ancient 
Jewish law specifically forbade a parent from testifying against his or her children, 
and the Romans mandated that parents, children, patrons, freemen and slaves could 
not testify against each other.10  Currently, the laws of France, Germany and Sweden 
embody a parent-child privilege whereby no relative by blood or marriage may be 
forced to testify against each other.11   The United States does not, for the most part, 
recognize such a privilege. 
The United States does recognize several privileges, including the attorney-client 
privilege, physician-patient privilege, priest-penitent privilege, psychotherapist-
patient privilege, and spousal privilege.12  However, only two federal district courts13  
                                                                
4Gregory W. Franklin, Note, The Judicial Development of the Parent-Child Testimonial 
Privilege:  Too Big for Its Britches? 26 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 145, n.1 (1984), citing Daniel 
R. Coburn, Child-Parent Communications: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the Child, 74 DICK. 
L. REV. 599 (1970). 
5See H.R. 3577, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998); and S. 1721, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998). 
6See H.R. 3577. 
7See S. 1721. 
8Id. 
9Wendy M. Watts, The Parent-Child Privilege: Hardly a New or Revolutionary Concept, 
28 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 583, 587 (1987). 
10Id. at 592 
11Id. at 593 (the prevailing view in the civil countries of Western Europe is that no person 
will be forced to divulge confidences between himself and another family member). 
12Id. at 594. 
13See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Agosto), 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983); In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings (Greenburg), 11 Fed. R. Serv. (Callaghan) 579 (D. Conn. 1982). 
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(located in Nevada and Connecticut) and four states14 (Idaho, Minnesota, 
Massachusetts, and New York) recognize a parent-child privilege.  Nine federal 
circuits have explicitly rejected a parent-child privilege.15  
Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 501 enables courts to interpret and create 
privileges governed by common law and in light of reason and experience.16  
Commentators have formulated various tests to recognize a testimonial privilege.17 
                                                                
14See IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7) (1997); MINN. STAT, § 595.02(1)(j) (1997).  New York has a 
judicially-recognized privilege.  See also People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 422 
N.Y.S.2d 309 (Westchester County Ct. 1979).  Massachusetts law, while not recognizing a 
parent-child privilege, prevents a minor child from testifying against a parent in a criminal 
proceeding.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20 (1998). 
15See In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (John Doe), 103 
F.3d 1140 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Jones, 683 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1982); In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings (Starr), 647 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1981); Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 
1985); United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Davies, 768 
F.2d 893 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1008 (1985); United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 
(9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 903 (1980); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (John 
Doe), 842 F.2d 244 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 894 (1988); In re Grand Jury Subpoena 
(Santarelli), 740 F.2d 816 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), reh’g denied, 749 F.2d 733 (11th Cir. 
1984). 
16FED. R. EVID. 501. 
17Dean Wigmore’s four factor formula to establish a new privilege is the most respected: 
 
1) The communication must originate in a confidence that will not be disclosed. 
2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory 
maintenance of the relation between the parties. 
3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be 
sedulously fostered. 
4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications 
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of the 
litigation. 
 
8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). 
Manley has formulated a different test that focuses on whether the privilege satisfies the 
following emotions and desires: 
 
1) Instinctive revulsion against the betrayal of confidence.  
2) A sense of compassion even for a transgressor, i.e. a feeling that there should be for 
every man some sanctuary beyond the reach of society’s law where he may safely 
confide his guilty secrets in an attempt to ease his troubled spirit. 
3) A sense of fair play related to the Norman view of a lawsuit as a species of contest 
or sporting event wherein it would be too easy, and hence unfair and against ‘the rules 
of the game,’ to hound a man to his doom by convicting him through the lips of his 
own intimate friends, family, or medical, legal, or spiritual advisors. 
4) A desire to preserve the function of certain socially valuable relationships even at 
the cost of occasional suppression of the truth and injustice in such, presumably few, 
particular cases. 
5) A feeling of individual and professional pride and self-importance in being the 
inviolable repository of others’ secrets. 
 
Manley, Patient, Penitent, Client and Spouse in New York, 21 N.Y. ST. B.A. BULL. 288, 290 
(1949). 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
44 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:41 
While the parent-child privilege arguably passes these tests, no circuit court has been 
willing to recognize the privilege.18  Courts have been overwhelmingly opposed to 
recognizing a parent-child privilege, broad or narrow, without legislative action.19  
Although no circuit court has adopted the parent-child privilege, some have implied 
possible recognition if federal law, rather than state law, controlled the case or if the 
issue arose under different circumstances.20 
In Jaffee v. Redmond,21 the Supreme Court for the first time recognized a 
privilege that was not in existence at common law when the Federal Rules of 
Evidence were enacted in 1975:  the psychotherapist-patient privilege.22  The Court 
in Jaffee declared that Rule 501 did not “freeze the law,” and that whenever the 
public and private interests furthered by the privilege outweigh the cost to the search 
for the truth, a new privilege should be recognized.23  The Third Circuit, the first to 
consider the parent-child privilege after Jaffee, declined to do so based on four basic 
reasons: 
(1) The overwhelming majority of all courts - federal or state - have 
rejected such a privilege . . . . (2) No reasoned analysis of Federal Rules of 
Evidence 501 or of the standards established by the Supreme Court or by 
[the Third Circuit] supports the creation of such a privilege.  (3) Creation 
of such a privilege would have no impact on the parental relationship and 
hence would neither benefit that relationship nor serve any social policy. 
(4) Although [courts] have the authority to recognize a new privilege, the 
recognition of such a privilege, if one is to be recognized, should be left to 
Congress.24 
The Third Circuit also stated that the privilege should not be created because it 
does not pass the second and fourth factors of the Wigmore test:25 confidentiality in 
the form of testimonial privilege is not indispensable for a successful parent-child 
relationship, and the truth-seeking function of the judicial system outweighs the 
relatively insignificant injury to the relationship resulting from non-recognition of 
                                                                
18See cases cited supra note 15. 
19See id. 
20Yolanda L. Ayala & Thomas C. Martyn, Note, To Tell or Not to Tell? An Analysis of 
Testimonial Privileges: The Parent-Child and Reporter’s Privileges, 9 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL 
COMMENT. 163, n.27, n.28 (1993), [hereinafter Note, To Tell or Not to Tell?] citing Port v. 
Heard, 764 F.2d 423, 430 (5th Cir. 1985)(indicating defendant’s father and stepfather would 
have been excused if federal rather than Texas, law applied); United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 
1253 (6th Cir. 1985) (declining to address whether parent-child privilege should be adopted in 
situations involving minors); and United States v. Jones, 683 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1982) 
(implying parent-child privileges may be applicable otherwise). 
21518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
22See id.  See also Daniel Capra, A “New” Privilege: Parent-Child, N.Y. L. J., May 9, 
1997, at 3. 
23518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
24In re grand Jury Proceedings (John Doe), 103 F.3d 1140, 1146-7 (3d Cir. 1997). 
25See supra note 17. 
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the privilege.26  The dissent disagreed with these two points, finding that the 
privilege is essential for parent-child relationships and that the injury is not 
outweighed by the states’ interests.27 
The Third Circuit stated that the legislature is best equipped to deal with such 
issues as whether the privilege should apply to adult children, adopted children or 
unemancipated minors, whether parents include stepparents or grandparents, whether 
the privilege should extend to siblings, and whether the presence of another family 
member automatically destroys the privilege.28  Generally, courts believe that a 
matter with this kind of uncertainty is better left to the legislature.29 
III.  THE CONTROVERSY 
There is great disagreement between courts and the majority of legal 
commentators and academics over whether to recognize a parent-child testimonial 
privilege.30  Because privileges obstruct the search for truth and because the 
administration of justice relies on the court’s ability to hear all relevant evidence, 
courts have been reluctant to expand existing privileges and create new ones.31  The 
courts, reluctant to place any obstacles in the path of the judicial system’s truth-
seeking function, are not willing to incorporate a new privilege where the injury to 
individual society members is arguably not outweighed by the state’s interest in 
seeking the truth.32  
The majority of legal commentators and academics on this subject, however, are 
in favor of a parent-child privilege.33  Legal commentators and academics have 
espoused the parent-child privilege based on a number of reasons.  First, some legal 
commentators and academics predicate the necessity of a parent-child privilege on 
the Supreme Court’s recognition of the fundamental right to privacy and of familial 
autonomy.34  Second, academics and commentators base the need for a privilege on 
social reasons including the “violence done to the child, the damage to family unity, 
                                                                
26See In re Grand Jury (John Doe), 103 F.3d 1140, 1152 (3d. Cir. 1997). 
27Id. at 1160 (“confidentiality underlies the parent-child relationship.... the damage 
resulting from compelling a parent against his child, in most if not all cases, outweighs the 
benefit associated with correct disposal of the litigation”). 
28Id. at 1155. 
29See cases cited supra note 15. 
30Compare cases cited supra note 15 with Marianne Scott, Comment, Parent-Child 
Testimonial Privilege: Preserving and Protecting the Fundamental Right to Family Privacy, 
52 U. CIN. L. REV. 901 (1983); Note, Parent-Child Loyalty and Testimonial Privilege, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 910 (1987). 
31See Franklin, supra note 4, at 146. 
32See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (John Doe), 103 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir. 1997). 
33See id. at 1146, n.12 (citing numerous law review articles in favor of a parent-child 
privilege). 
34Marianne Scott, Comment, Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege: Preserving and 
Protecting the Fundamental Right to Family Privacy, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 901 (1983); see also 
supra note 9. 
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and the consequent injury to society”35 that may result from compelled testimony of 
a child against a parent.36  Third, academics and commentators believe that a parent-
child privilege should exist for reasons similar to those reasons for the existence of 
currently recognized privileges: to protect potentially embarrassing communications 
which were engaged in for the purpose of guidance.37   
Among commentators in favor of the parent-child privilege, there exists 
controversy over how broadly to construe the privilege.  The debate is over several 
issues including whether adult children or only unemancipated children are covered, 
whether the privilege is reciprocal in that parents may not testify against children and 
children may not testify against parents, and whether only confidential 
communications are covered or all adverse testimony is protected.38  Although legal 
commentators and courts generally disagree on whether or not to have a parent-child 
privilege, many legal commentators also advocate for a legislative resolution, rather 
than the courts “creating” law.39   
IV.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Recently, Congress rose to the courts’ and commentators’ challenge to legislate 
regarding the parent-child privilege.  Congress, spurred by Independent Counsel 
Kenneth Starr’s investigation of Monica Lewinsky,40 finally responded in March of 
1998 and introduced two separate bills dealing with the issue of parent-child 
compelled testimony.41  The House bill proposed substantive changes to the Federal 
Rules of Evidence to explicitly recognize a parent-child testimonial privilege.42  The 
                                                                
35J. Tyson Covey, Note, Making Form Follow Function: Considerations in Creating and 
Applying a Statutory Parent-Child Privilege, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 879, 879 (1990); see also 
Scott, supra note 34. 
36Note, Parent-Child Loyalty and Testimonial Privilege, 100 HARV. L. REV. 910 (1987) 
(arguing that strong and supportive parent-child bonds are so important to society that they 
should be protected by a testimonial privilege); see also Covey, supra note 35. 
37See Ayala & Martyn, supra note 20. 
38Compare Franklin, supra note 4 (arguing for a privilege limited to minor children, non-
reciprocal with only communication from the child to the parent protected, and protecting only 
confidential communications, not all adverse testimony) with Scott, supra note 34 (arguing for 
a privilege including adult children, reciprocal in nature, held by both parties, and protecting 
adverse testimony as well as confidential communications). 
39See, e.g., Covey, supra note 35; and Capra, supra note 22. 
40See 144 CONG. REC. E504-01 (daily ed. March 27, 1998) (statement of Rep. Lofgren) 
(“there now exists a serious defect in our Federal criminal and civil law and procedures that 
has unfortunately been brought into focus by Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr’s 
investigation of the President.  Under Federal law and the law of most States, children can be 
compelled to testify against their parents, and parents against their children”).  See also 144 
CONG. REC. S1508-02 (daily ed. March 6, 1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“I recently spoke 
. . . about the disgust that I share with most Americans about the tactics of Special Prosecutor 
Kenneth Starr and the disturbing spectacle of hauling a mother before a grand jury to reveal 
her intimate conversations with her daughter in a matter . . . which do[es] not pose [a] grave 
threat to the public safety”). 
41See H.R. 3577, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998); S. 1721, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998). 
42See H.R. 3577. 
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Senate proposed the Attorney General investigate to determine whether the Federal 
Rules of Evidence should be amended to explicitly recognize a parent-child 
privilege.43  The following section will individually examine both bills in light of 
prior judicial decisions and writings of legal commentators regarding what each 
believes to be the proper analysis of the parent-child privilege. 
V.  ANALYSIS OF THE HOUSE BILL 
The House bill, named the Confidence in the Family Act, proposed a substantive 
amendment to Federal Rules of Evidence 501 specifically allowing for a parent-child 
privilege.44  The House proposed in relevant part that Rule 501 of Federal Rules of 
Evidence be amended to include the following: 
(b)(1) A witness may not be compelled to testify against a child or parent 
of the witness. 
(2) A witness may not be compelled to disclose the content of a 
confidential communication with a child or parent of the witness. 
(3) For purposes of this subdivision, ‘child’ means, with respect to an 
individual, a birth, adoptive, or step-child of the individual, and any 
person (such as a foster child or a relative of whom the individual has 
long-term custody) with respect to whom the court recognizes the 
individual as having a right to act as a parent. 
(4) The privileges provided in this subdivision shall be governed by 
principles of the common law, as they may be interpreted by the courts of 
the United States in the light of reason and experience, that are similar to 
the principles that apply to the similar privileges of a witness with respect 
to a spouse of a witness.”45  
The issue is whether this bill is well drafted in that it achieves the primary goals 
of a parent-child privilege with minimal intrusion on the truth-seeking function of 
the law.46 
A.  Goals of the Confidence in the Family Act 
The House bill would ensure that parents and children would not be compelled to 
testify against one another.47  This shields witnesses from the trauma associated with 
testifying against a child or parent and creates recognition and respect for the special 
nature of parent-child relationships.48  Two goals can be ascertained.  One goal is to 
protect parent-child witnesses from the “cruel trilemma” whereby the witness is 
                                                                
43See S. 1721. 
44See H.R. 3577. 
45Id. (emphasis added). 
46See Covey, supra note 35, at 887. 
47See H.R. 3577. 
48See 144 CONG. REC. E504 (daily ed. March 27, 1998) (statement of Rep. Lofgren). 
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faced with three disagreeable options: (1) testify truthfully and betray their family; 
(2) refuse to testify and risk contempt charges; or (3) testify falsely and hinder the 
truth-seeking function of the judicial system even more.49  The second goal is to 
protect children’s and parents’ reasonable expectations of privacy when seeking 
guidance, comfort or support.50   This bill would acknowledge respect for the familial 
sphere and allow and foster open communication between parents and children, thus 
protecting the parent-child relationship, like the spousal relationship, from undue 
governmental intrusions.51  These goals would lend support to the Constitution’s 
insistence that law enforcement officials respect the privacy of the individual and the 
home52 as well as protect children.   
The purposes of the spousal privilege are similar.  The adverse testimony 
privilege serves to protect the marriage from disharmony, while the confidential 
communications privilege serves to encourage open communication within a 
marriage.53  Both relationships, spousal and parent-child, are clearly regarded as 
valuable to society.54  Similar to the spousal privilege, the parent-child privilege 
would continue to protect the familial sphere and demonstrate the government’s 
respect for confidentiality within the family.55 
B.  Reciprocity 
The House bill takes a clear position on the controversy surrounding the parent-
child privilege.56  The Confidence in the Family Act provides for a reciprocal 
privilege.57  The bill provides that a child may not be compelled to testify against a 
parent and a parent may not be compelled to testify against a child.58  Almost all 
existing or proposed parent-child privilege statutes restrict coverage to 
                                                                
49See id.; see also Watts, supra note 9. 
50See 144 CONG. REC. E504 (daily ed. March 27, 1998) (statement of Rep. Lofgren). 
51Covey, supra note 35, at 888 (legislators should keep in mind two primary goals when 
drafting a statute recognizing the parent-child privilege: (1) protect children’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy; and (2) protect minor children from the traumatic and potentially 
destructive experience of testifying against their parents or having their parents testify against 
them). 
52Sandra Guerra, Family Values? The Family as an Innocent Victim of Civil Drug Asset 
Forfeiture, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 343 (1996). 
53See Franklin supra note 4; see also Watts, supra note 9,  at 598 (“the Court [in Trammel 
v. United States, 445, U.S. 40 (1980)] reasoned that the justification for the privilege against 
adverse spousal testimony lies in the privilege’s perceived role in fostering harmony and 
sanctity of the marriage relationship”). 
54See id. 
55See Covey, supra note 35. 
56See H.R. 3577, 105th  Cong., 2d Sess. (1998). 
57See id. 
58See id.  (emphasis added). 
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communications from child to parent.59   Justifications for this restriction are based 
on the reasoning that the parent-child privilege should resemble a professional 
privilege.60  Advocates of a non-reciprocal parent-child privilege believe that the 
main goal for a parent-child privilege is to allow children to seek guidance and help, 
and that this goal outweighs the impediment on the government’s truth-seeking 
function.61  Proponents of this belief insist that children require parental advice and 
guidance more than parents require advice from children.62  Furthermore, these 
advocates argue that children expect communications with their parents to remain 
confidential, more so than parents expect of their conversations with their children.63  
The need to protect parents from children’s divulgence, it is believed, is not as great 
as the need to protect children from parents’ disclosures.64  Parents’ communications 
with the child not concerned with guidance for the child, therefore, should remain 
unprotected according to advocates of this belief.65   
Reciprocity, however, better realizes the goal of protecting parents and children 
from the cruel trilemma - to spare the children from the traumatic experience of 
having to betray their parents or of having their parents betray them.66  Furthermore, 
the professional-relationship goal of seeking guidance is well served by reciprocity.  
As parents and children grow older, the roles often reverse - parents may look to 
children for guidance.67  This is more apparent with immigrant parents whose 
children may be more assimilated into the American culture.  The parents  look to 
their children for guidance about the different social, legal, and cultural ways of the 
United States.  Additionally, in today’s era of high divorce rates, parents and 
children typically look to each other for guidance when spouses separate.68  The 
spousal privilege allows for reciprocity because communication between both 
spouses is essential; an ideal parent-child relationship should encompass the mutual 
love, intimacy and trust associated with the marital relationship.69  The House bill’s 
reciprocity protects a family’s expectations of privacy and allows for children and 
parents to look to each other for guidance. 
                                                                
59See Note, Covey, supra note 35, at 903.  See also IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7) (1997); MINN. 
STAT, § 595.02(1)(j) (1997).  
60See Franklin, supra note 4, at 172. 
61Id. 
62Id. 
63Id. 
64Id. 
65See Franklin, supra note 4, at 172. 
66See Covey, supra note 35, at 904. 
67See Scott, supra note 34, at 919. 
68Id. at 919.  It is estimated that approximately one-half of marriages end in divorce.  It is 
much more difficult to terminate a parent-child relationship than a marriage. 
69See Scott, supra note 34; but see Franklin, supra note 4, at 171 (arguing that 
relationships of parent-child and spouses are fundamentally different; spouses look to each 
other for guidance - two-way - whereas children look to parent for guidance - one-way). 
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C.  Confidential Communications vs. Adverse Testimony 
The Confidence in the Family Act protects only confidential communications;70 
adverse testimony is not protected.  The House believes this would be the best 
compromise between allowing prosecutors to search for the truth and respecting 
familial privacy.71  By limiting the privilege to cover only those confidential 
communications, the House limits the breadth of protection to only those 
communications necessary for the guidance and emotional health of the child.72  The 
House bill does allow for parents to offer needed guidance to their children without 
fear of incriminating them while still allowing for the courts to search for the truth.  
Proponents of this limitation on the privilege argue that a broader privilege extending 
to adverse testimony would lead to abuse and is too intrusive on the state’s need to 
gather evidence.73  Professional privileges also only cover confidential 
communications; adverse testimony is not protected.74  The limitation to confidential 
communications serves the purpose of allowing for openness when seeking 
guidance, but does not relieve the witness of his or her trilemma. 
The Supreme Court recognized an adverse testimony privilege in spousal 
relations.75  In many states, the spousal privilege protects adverse testimony, 
although some states do protect only confidential communications between 
spouses.76  The adverse testimony privilege in the marital privilege serves mainly to 
prevent marital disharmony.77  The House bill states the parent-child privilege should 
be developed similar to the spousal privilege;78 however the bill already differs from 
the spousal privilege in those states where an adverse testimony spousal privilege is 
recognized.  In view of the spousal privilege’s limitation in many states, a broader 
parent-child privilege may seem overbroad.79  In these states, the confidential 
communications limitation is appropriate. However, in parent-child communications, 
confidential communications may be difficult to distinguish from other information 
                                                                
70See H.R. 3577, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998). 
71See 144 CONG. REC. 2504 (daily ed. March 27, 1998) (statement of Rep. Lofgren). 
72See Franklin, supra note 4, at 172. 
73Id. 
74See, e.g., Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503 (Attorney-Client Privilege), Rule 
504(b) (Psychotherapist-Patient) and Rule 506 (Clergymen).  FED. R. EVID. DELETED AND 
SUPERSEDED MATERIALS. 
75See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980). 
76See Developments in the Law - Privileged Communication v. Familial Privilege, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 1563, 1567 n.29-30 (1985).  Fourteen states statutorily empower a party to 
prevent a spouse from giving adverse testimony - Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, Virginia, Washington, 
West Virginia, and Alaska,   Four states’ statutes render a spouse incompetent to testify 
against his or her spouse - Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wyoming.  California, Florida, and 
Wisconsin by statute recognize a confidential communications privilege. 
77See Franklin, supra note 4, at 153. 
78See H.R. 3577, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998). 
79See Franklin, supra note 4, at 173. 
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available to family members; another family member may learn of communications 
as a result of the family’s familiarity with each other’s activities.80  In states where 
only confidential communications are protected, both written and oral expressions 
are protected.81  An expression is confidential if the communicator subjectively 
intended the  communication not be disclosed.82  There is a presumption that 
communications between spouses are confidential, but this can be rebutted in two 
ways: (1) if the spouse knew a third party was present; and (2) even if 
communications were in private, a showing that the communicant intended 
statements to be disclosed to specific third parties.83  Because determining whether  a 
communication is confidential may be extremely difficult in parent-child situations, 
an adverse testimony privilege is more appropriate.  An adverse testimony privilege 
would be preferable to dissolve the dilemma of family betrayal and would likely be 
more practical in view of the difficulties associated with a privilege limited to 
confidential communications.  
Limiting the privileged testimony to only those confidential communications 
instead of the broader, adverse testimony approach does not serve the purposes of 
protecting children from the trauma associated with testifying against their parents or 
vice versa, of alleviating the witness’ trilemma,  or of protecting the familial privacy.  
Compelled parent-child testimony that leads to incriminating evidence would still 
sever family ties, invite perjury, and cause trauma.84  Limiting the parent-child 
privilege to only confidential communications does not achieve the goal of 
preventing the trauma associated with the betrayal of a family member; parents and 
children may still feel like they are betraying their family by giving testimony that is 
adverse, for instance, negating alibis.  The ABA Proposed Parent-Child Privilege 
Statute85 recommended an adverse testimonial privilege for criminal trials and 
confidential communications for civil trials.  The sense of betrayal in criminal trials 
would be greater when loss of liberty is at stake.  In civil trials, the concern is not 
whether betrayal leads to confinement but whether the expectations of confidentiality 
were honored.86  A privilege protecting only confidential communications does not 
completely eliminate the sense of betrayal that would accompany testifying 
adversely when it would lead to loss of liberty, as it would in federal criminal trials. 
                                                                
80See Scott, supra note 34, at 926. 
81See Developments in the Law - Privilege Communication v. Familial Privilege, supra 
note 76, at 1572. 
82Id. at 1573. 
83Id.  
84See Scott, supra note 34, at 926. 
85See Watts, supra note 9, at 618-23.  The ABA proposed a parent-child privilege which 
provided for an adverse parent-child testimonial privilege held by the witness in criminal 
trials, except when the defendant is charged with a crime against a family member and when 
the witness is involved in any criminal activity. §102.  The ABA proposal provided for a 
confidential communications privilege jointly held by both parties in civil trials; exceptions to 
the confidential communications privilege include when the parents and children are opposing 
parties, when crimes are committed against a family member, and when mental competence is 
at issue. § 103. 
86See Covey, supra note 35, at 905. 
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The confidential communications privilege also raises a number of unanswered 
questions such as how the law would be enforced.  Does the parent or child 
specifically have to say this conversation is confidential?  Would that be realistic? 
Additionally, it may be difficult to distinguish confidential communications from all 
other communication.87  The goals of the privilege are not limited to allowing 
children seeking guidance but include protecting the family from government 
intrusion and decreasing the trauma to children.  A broader privilege protecting 
adverse testimony as well should be adopted in lieu of a narrower privilege 
protecting only confidential communications. This would foster open 
communications as well as relieve the witness of the sense of betrayal.  
D.  Definition of Child 
The Confidence in the Family Act defines child broadly, leaving much discretion 
to the courts.  The definition of child includes a birth child, adoptive child, step-child 
and anyone else the court recognizes as a ward of a person (including long-term 
foster children).88  This leaves some discretion within the court to include primary 
caretakers.  This definition is broad, but accurately reflects today’s rapidly changing 
family situations.  The catchall provision protects those persons who are effectively 
rather than just legally responsible for the children.89  This expansive definition is 
preferable because it furthers the goal of protecting the child’s expectations of 
confidentiality when requesting guidance from parents or parental figures.  For 
critics that argue such a broadness will lead to abuse and over-extension, the general 
antipathy of courts in recognizing privileges should keep potential abuses in check 
and will limit the use of this provision to those parent-child relationships that are 
genuine.90 
The House bill makes no mention of an age limitation to only apply the privilege 
to minor children, which many statutes and courts advocate.91  By not limiting the 
privilege to minors, Congress respects families in the broader sense.  Just because 
children grow older, they may not necessarily grow apart from their families.92  The 
extension of the privilege beyond the child’s minority recognizes that many parent-
child relationships continue after emancipation of the child, frequently leading to a 
role reversal type situation as the parent grows older and becomes increasingly 
dependent on the child.93  Furthermore, the bill acknowledges that children reside 
with their parents until well after emancipation, and is consistent with the 
requirement many states have that children support their parents as the states require 
                                                                
87Id. 
88See H.R. 3577, 105th Cong, 2d Sess. (1998). 
89See Covey, supra note 35, at 901. 
90Id. at 902. 
91Id. Practically all existing and proposed parent-child privileges apply only during a 
child’s minority, including Idaho and Minnesota codes and the ABA Proposed Parent-Child 
Privilege Statute, as discussed in Watts, supra note 9. 
92See Scott, supra note 34, at 918. 
93Id. 
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parents to support their children.94  With the state requiring families to continue 
support after emancipation of the children, it is only appropriate that the privilege 
continues beyond that as well.  Many commentators argue that the privilege is not 
necessary once the child is grown as the child does not depend on the parent for 
guidance.95  If protecting the child’s expectations of confidentiality and allowing him 
or her to go to the parents for guidance were the only goals of the statute, this may 
seem reasonable.  However, an important goal of the statute is to protect families, 
like the spousal privilege protects marriages.96  The family does not dissolve when a 
member becomes older.97  Parent-child relationships continue through adulthood and 
contribute to the well-being of individuals and society.98  Parent-child loyalty 
existing beyond the child’s minority should be fostered for the benefit of society.  
The inclusion of adult children in the parent-child privilege protects family loyalty 
and better serves society. 
E.  Exceptions 
The House bill makes no explicit exceptions to the parent-child privilege.  
Advocates of the privilege acknowledge exceptions would be appropriate in certain 
situations.99  Examples of these exceptions include crimes committed by a parent 
against the child himself or other family members, and situations in which an adult 
child is suspected of abusing an elderly parent.100  Each of the three existing state 
statutes provides for an exception when a crime was committed against  a family 
member.101  In spousal privileges, which the bill states should guide in the 
development of the parent-child privilege,102 the privilege does not apply if one 
spouse committed a crime against another,103 and most states do not allow the spousal 
                                                                
94Id. at 924.  Parents are often obligated to continue support for physically or mentally 
handicapped children past the age of majority.  Id., n. 77.  Additionally, after a divorce, the 
noncustodial parent may be required to contribute to college expenses.  Id.  As of 1984, 27 
states had filial support statutes.  Id. n. 78. 
95See Franklin, supra note 4, at 170. 
96See 144 CONG. REC. E504-01 (daily ed. March 27, 1998) (statement of Rep. Lofgren) 
(“the damage that such an experience [providing testimony against children] can cause 
parents, children, and familial relationships is readily apparent and worthy of our concern”). 
97See, e.g., Letter from Alex Abrams, lawyer, to Editor, N.Y. TIMES, March 30, 1998, at 
A16.  (“Among young unmarried men and women, like Ms. Lewinsky, a bond with one or 
both parents may often be the most intimate of all.”). 
98See Scott, supra note 34, at 919-20.  “By serving as a reference point for people’s 
beliefs, values, and choices of action, intergenerational ties help prevent such a fraying of the 
fabric of society.”  Id. 
99Id. at 927. 
100Id. 
101Id. at 927, n.90; see also IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7) (1997); MINN. STAT, § 595.02(1)(j) 
(1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20 (1998). 
102See H.R. 3577, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998). 
103See Developments in the Law - Privileged Communications v. Familial Privileges, 
supra note 76, at 1570. 
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privilege when one spouse is accused of abusing a child or another family 
member.104  It can be reasonably inferred, therefore, that these exceptions are implied 
in the bill through developed spousal privilege law and “in light of reason and 
experience.”105 
The statute does not specifically state who may waive the privilege, but in 
spousal privileges, as modified by the Court in Trammel,106 an adverse testimony 
privilege rests with the testifying spouse, and only that spouse may waive the 
privilege.107  In federal criminal cases, a confidential communications privilege can 
either be waived by the spouse who made the communication or by the defendant, 
regardless of whether the defendant was the communicant.108  The bill does state the 
privilege should be adopted similar to the spousal privilege.  It would appear, 
therefore, that the parent-child privilege would work in a similar fashion. 
What would be protected under the statute?  Monica Lewinsky’s mother in 
Kenneth Starr’s investigation of President Clinton would not have had to testify in 
front of a grand jury as to what her daughter told her about her relations.109  Alan and 
Sonye Grossberg of New Jersey would not have been subpoenaed to reveal what 
their daughter told them about the death of her newborn son of whom their daughter 
was accused of leaving in a motel dumpster.110  Mrs. Pisani, the mother of the 
Massachusetts patrolman being investigated for cheating on his exams, would not 
have been forced to refuse to testify.111  The ten-year-old child in South Dakota 
would not have had to testify against his father in the murder trial of another child.112  
                                                                
104Id. at 1570-71. 
105H.R. 3577. 
106445 U.S. 40 (1980). 
107See Franklin, supra note 4, at 153. 
108See Development in the Law - Privileged Communication v. Familial Privileges, supra 
note 76, at 1571-72. 
109See Editorial, Mother and Witness; Painful or Not, Marcia Lewis’ Testimony is 
Important, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, February 18, 1998, at A14.  See also Baker, supra 
note 2. 
110See Doug Most, A Court Has Ears Inside the Home; Parent-Child Secrets Not Safe, 
THE RECORD (Bergen County, NJ), December 7, 1997, at A1.  Amy Grossberg, 18, and her 
high school boyfriend were charged with murdering their baby and leaving the body in a 
dumpster.  The Grossbergs have resisted the subpoena.  See also Editorials, Subpoenaed 
Parents, 151 N.J.L.J. 926 (1998).  
111See Note, Parent-Child Loyalty and Testimonial Privilege, 100 HARV. L. REV. 910 
(February 1987); Harvey Silvergate, American Family Values, NAT’L L.J., November 13, 
1995, at A23.  Mrs. Pisani, an elderly Italian mother, was subpoenaed to testify against her 
son, a patrolman, being investigated in a police-exam cheating scandal.  The court refused to 
quash to subpoena.  Mrs. Pisani refused to testify, and the government did not seek to go 
further. 
112See United States v. Elk, 955 F. Supp. 1170 (D. S.D. 1997).  Mr. Elk was charged with 
the murder of a twenty-month old male child.  Prosecutors called his ten-year-old son as a 
witness before the grand jury, which the defendant claimed caused the child psychological 
trauma. 
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All of these people would have had the right to remain loyal to their families and 
continue to communicate with them. 
VI.  SENATE BILL 
The Senate takes an entirely different approach.113  Rather than giving outright 
support for a parent-child privilege, the Senate attempts a balancing approach.  The 
Senate proposed that the Attorney General study the development of a parent-child 
privilege and the measurements that should be taken to ensure confidentiality of 
communications between parents and children.114  The Senate specifically tries to 
balance the truth-seeking function of the courts against family confidentiality; where 
crimes of violence or drugs are at stake, the family’s privacy rights are secondary.115  
The Senate wants to weigh the “danger that free communication between a child and 
his or her parent will be inhibited and familial privacy and relationships will be 
damaged” against public safety and integrity of the judicial system.116 
The bill proposed that the Attorney General, within one year, evaluate the need 
for a parent-child privilege.  Based on prosecutors’ reluctance to use parents and 
children as witnesses against each other because of its dangers,117 it is unlikely that 
the Attorney General will find that a parent-child privilege would change the current 
state of criminal prosecution.  Even if the Attorney General does find a need for a 
parent-child privilege, in its attempt to balance the law enforcement needs of society 
against the family, the Senate has decided that familial relationships outweigh the 
need for truth in all situations except those involving violence or drugs.118  Therefore, 
Monica Lewinsky’s mother would be spared, but the Grossberg parents would not.  
Mrs. Pisani would be spared, but the ten-year-old child would not.  
                                                                
113See S. 1721, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998). 
114S. 1721 provides in relevant part:  
 
(a) The Attorney General of the United States shall  
(1) study and evaluate the manner in which the states have taken measures to protect 
the confidentiality of communications between children and parents and, in particular, 
whether such measures have been taken in matters that do not involve allegations of 
violent or drug trafficking conduct. ...[and submit to Congress] 
(b) (2) recommendations based on the findings on the need for and appropriateness of 
further action by the Federal Government . . .  
(c) the Judicial Conference of the United States shall complete a review and submit a 
report to Congress on  
(1) whether the Federal Rules of Evidence should be amended to guarantee that the 
confidentiality of communications by a child to his or her parent in matters that do not 
involve allegations of violent or drug trafficking conduct will be adequately protected 
in federal court proceedings; and  
(2) if the rules should be so amended, a proposal for amendments to the rules that 
provides the maximum protection possible for the confidentiality of such 
communications. 
115See S. 1721. 
116Id. 
117Discussed infra (p. 16-17). 
118See S. 1721, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998). 
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The differentiation between crimes of violence or drugs and other crimes does 
not serve the purposes of a privilege.  Witnesses would still undergo the cruel 
trilemma in cases where liberty is severely at stake.  In criminal trials of higher 
magnitude, society’s need for truth is arguably greater.  The Senate’s position states 
that society’s benefit in many situations outweighs society’s benefits from strong 
family ties.  However, in criminal trials where the penalty is more severe, parents 
and children are more susceptible to the trilemma; there is also a greater chance of 
perjury and frustration of the process.  Excluding crimes of violence or drugs from 
the protection of the privilege does not alleviate the witness’ trilemma problem as the 
loss of liberty is still so significant that the sense of betrayal would still be present 
and significant damage to the relationship would occur.  The balance that the Senate 
attempts to achieve would accomplish the goals of the parent-child privilege in a 
distinct minority of cases.  The House bill takes a more definitive stance. 
VII.  EFFECTS 
If the House bill passes as introduced, a new parent-child privilege would exist in 
federal courts similar to the spousal privilege.  This, in reality, would have very little 
effect on prosecutors.  The Department of Justice realizes special consideration is 
warranted when the witness is a close family member and typically tries to avoid 
compelling a witness to testify against a family member.119  In practice, Assistant 
United States Attorneys are reluctant to use family members.120  Rarely would it be 
necessary to use a parent’s testimony; prosecutors attempt to obtain evidence in other 
ways so the parental testimony is not necessary.121  According to one experienced 
Assistant United States Attorney, in more than ten years of prosecuting experience, 
not once has it been an issue where a parent must testify against his or her child.122   
Many practitioners are convinced that if a case is so thin that it depends on a parent’s 
or child’s testimony, it should not be brought.123  Parents forced to testify against 
their child may commit perjury or be willing to be held in contempt in order not to 
incriminate their children.124  The parents’ willingness to risk contempt frustrates any 
attempt to gather information.125  This does not help achieve the prosecutorial goal of 
seeking the truth.  Because of this bind, prosecutors rarely seek to pit parents and 
                                                                
119DEPT. OF JUSTICE MANUAL, §9-23.211 (1997) (“consideration should be given to 
whether the witness is a close family relative of the person against whom testimony is sought.  
A close family relative is a spouse, parent, child, grandparent, grandchild or sibling of the 
witness.  Absent specific justification, we will ordinarily avoid compelling the testimony of a 
witness who is a close family relative of the defendant on trial or of the person upon whose 
conduct grand jury scrutiny is focusing”) (emphasis added). 
120Based on conversations with an Assistant United States Attorney who requested his 
name be withheld. 
121Id. 
122Id. 
123See Harvey Silvergate, American Family Values, NAT’L L.J., November 13, 1995, at 
A23. 
124See Watts, supra note 9. 
125Based on conversations with an Assistant United States Attorney who requested his 
name be withheld.  See also Mrs. Pisani’s case, supra note 111. 
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children against each other.126  Prosecutors recognize the strong emotional ties 
between parents and children.127  There is a greater risk of perjury with witnesses 
who are family relatives of the defendant, and it is more likely to alienate a jury.128  
The chance of perjury would effectively render the testimony useless, and the 
confrontation between a parent and child may antagonize a jury.129  In Idaho, where a 
parent-chid testimonial privilege prohibits compelling parents from disclosing 
confidential communications from their minor children, cases involving minors have 
not been made more difficult since enaction of the statute eight years ago.130   
If the House bill does pass, it will send a clear message that privacy in the home 
outweighs the impediments on the truth-seeking function of the courts.  It would say 
that family values are worth fostering seriously.  If the Senate approach is taken, this 
message would be tempered.  The message would then be that the war on drugs and 
violence is more important than familial autonomy and privacy, but other, less 
“wrong” crimes are not. 
If the House bill does not pass, the message is more uncertain.  On the one hand, 
it gives courts more reason not to create a privilege; after all, Congress did not see it 
worth legislating so the courts will likely be even more hesitant to create such a new 
privilege.  However, in creating the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress decided not 
to adopt the nine specified privileges, but instead decided to enact Rule 501 which 
gave courts power to expand privileges on a case-by-case basis.131  In doing so, 
Congress was not “freezing the law.”132  The physician-patient privilege was not 
included in the proposed rules and has since gained wide recognition.133  By merely 
acknowledging the need for a parent-child privilege, Congress is opening the door 
for courts to consider creating one.  However, courts have been extremely reluctant 
to create such a privilege and have consistently held if one were to be created, it 
                                                                
126See Doug Most, A Court Has Ears Inside the Home; Parent-Child Secrets Not Safe, 
THE RECORD (Bergen County, NJ), December 7, 1997, at A1. 
127See Naftali Bendavid, Lewinsky’s Mother Testifies: Starr’s Subpoena Stirs Up Ethical 
and Legal Debates, CHI. TRIB., February 11, 1998, at N1, quoting Bruce Yannett, New York 
attorney, “Prosecutors recognize there is a vital and important and special relationship 
between family members, and that before you intrude on that relationship you’d better have a 
compelling reason. . . . John Gotti’s parents weren’t subpoenaed.” 
128Based on conversations with an Assistant United States Attorney who requested his 
name be withheld. 
129Id. 
130Doug Most, A Court Has Ears Inside the Home; Parent-Child Secrets Not Safe, THE 
RECORD (Bergen County, NJ), December 7, 1997, at A1 citing Ken Jorgenson, a deputy 
attorney general in Boise, Idaho. 
131See FED. R. EVID. 501; and FED. R. EVID. DELETED AND SUPERSEDED RULES 502-513.  
See also Watts, supra note 9, at 589. 
132Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
133See FED. R. EVID. DELETED AND SUPERSEDED RULES 502-513; Franklin, supra note 4, at 
149 (more than two-thirds of states statutorily recognize a physician-patient privilege). 
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should be left to the legislature.134  It is likely, then, that failure of the House bill 
would settle the controversy against a parent-child testimonial privilege. 
VIII.  PROPOSAL 
The purpose of the parent-child privilege should be a combination of the 
purposes behind the professional privileges and the spousal privilege.  Parent-child 
relationships are necessary for the nurturing, growth and survival of both parents and 
children.135   Guidance from the parent is vital to the task of parenting just as 
guidance from an attorney or physician is vital to his or her tasks.  Communication 
between parties in these cases should remain confidential to foster an open forum.  
However, the parent-child relationship is different from that of a doctor-patient or 
attorney-client.  Those professional relationships are affirmatively sought out for a 
specific reason and limited duration.  Parent-child relationships are not affirmatively 
sought out by the specific parties involved.  The relationship’s goal is to benefit 
society by fostering healthy, happy individuals.  Betrayal by a parent or child would 
likely sever the relationship or create a great deal of harm to this beneficial 
relationship.136  The goals of the parent-child privilege should be to allow open 
communication for guidance and to foster family relationships which are beneficial 
to society. 
The House bill accomplishes these goals relatively well.  By allowing for a 
reciprocal privilege, it alleviates the trauma associated with both a child testifying 
against his/her parents and the parent testifying against the child.  Protecting 
communication between parents and adult children as well as minors considers the 
continual need for guidance and fosters intergenerational relationships.  Creating a 
parent-child privilege, which is in general similar to a spousal privilege, shows that 
Congress values parent-child relationships as much as spousal relationships.  This 
message is consistent with the government’s emphasis on “family values.”137  
Structuring the parent-child privilege after the spousal privilege also decreases the 
novelty of the privilege; because existing law explains the spousal privilege, the 
parent-child privilege law will already be developed. 
The House bill fails in its goals, however, by limiting the privilege to confidential 
communications only.  While this would have protected Marcia Lewis from 
revealing Monica Lewinsky’s confidences, it will not alleviate the trauma associated 
with testifying against one’s parent or child.  Parents or children, if they know 
certain testimony will be adverse, are still likely to perjure themselves or refuse to 
make a statement to protect their loved ones.  Adverse testimony, as well as 
communications, should be protected to eliminate these concerns, and neither parent 
nor child should be forced to betray the other. 
The Senate bill does not achieve the goals of the parent-child privilege.  By 
limiting the privilege to only those cases not involving violence or drugs, the Senate 
still subjects witnesses to the cruel trilemma.  The Senate’s statement is that the 
parent-child relationship is not valued as much as a spousal relationship since no 
                                                                
134See cases cited supra note 15. 
135See Scott, supra note 34. 
136Id. 
137See Silvergate, supra note 123. 
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such limitation is placed on the spousal privilege.  In the Senate’s balance of family 
versus crime, society’s interest in punishing drug crimes is more valuable than the 
societal interest in fostering and maintaining good parent-child relations.  Though the 
Senate is attempting to open the debate forum on the issue of parent-child privilege, 
its statement is too diluted to be taken seriously.  Proposing a study to evaluate if a 
parent-child privilege should exist is not taking the concerns of the public seriously, 
especially in the aftermath of Marcia Lewis’ compelled testimony. 
The ideal parent-child privilege would be created by statute with leeway given to 
the courts to develop the privilege in a fashion similar to the spousal privilege.  Since 
the relationship is not entered into for a specific task, it should not end at a statute-
specified age.  The privilege would apply to children of all ages, minors and adults.  
The privilege would be reciprocal to alleviate the trauma and foster open 
communication.  If the witness wishes to voluntarily testify against a family member, 
he or she should be allowed to do so as there would be no trauma and the 
relationship is likely not worth fostering.138  The privilege should be a broad adverse 
testimony privilege to diminish the harm associated with betraying a loved one.  
Exceptions should be made when a crime is committed by one family member 
against another, similar to the spousal privilege exceptions.  The House bill is almost 
the ideal privilege statute.  By including adverse testimony under the protection of 
the privilege, the bill would be a model statute. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
The need for a parent-child privilege can be justified in terms of the 
constitutional right to privacy, the societal need to foster parent-child relationships 
and the need for individuals to develop their emotional and physical health.  The 
House’s Confidence in the Family Act139 correctly recognizes the importance of 
keeping the family sphere private and loyal.  By aiming the statute to protect the 
family and alleviate the cruel trilemma that parents and children face when 
compelled to testify against each other, the House bill acknowledges the need for a 
parent-child privilege by statute.  The House bill encourages guidance and 
communication by providing for a reciprocal privilege.  Including adult children 
under the protection of the privilege recognizes the importance of transgenerational 
relationships to society.  The broad definition of children embodied in the bill 
acknowledges the varying and dynamic families of today’s era.  The House fails in 
its effectiveness in achieving its goals by not providing for an adverse testimony 
privilege and instead providing for a limited confidential communications privilege.  
An adverse testimony privilege would better serve both goals of fostering 
communication and alleviating trauma.  The Senate bill,140 with its proposal of a 
study, does not effectively recognize the importance of a parent-child privilege.  By 
not allowing for a parent-child privilege in cases where drugs or violence are 
involved, the Senate shows its unwillingness to place much importance on familial 
loyalty. 
                                                                
138See Scott, supra note 34, at 926; but see Scott, supra note 34, at 929, n.89 (defendants 
should be able to prevent voluntary testimony in order to prevent prosecutors from improperly 
inducing parents or children testify). 
139H.R. 3577, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998). 
140S. 1721, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998). 
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The ideal parent-child privilege would be reciprocal, would protect adverse 
testimony, and would define children broadly.  It would be developed in a fashion 
similar to that of the spousal privilege.  Creation of a broad parent-child privilege 
would be consistent with the fundamental right to family privacy.  Creation of such a 
privilege would also recognize and allow for loyalty between parents and children.  
Finally, creation of a parent-child privilege would foster open, nurturing, and 
beneficial relationships between parents and children.  The law should recognize a 
parent-child privilege to protect the constitutional right to family relationships and to 
foster parent-child relationships which are beneficial to society. 
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss1/5
